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But	what	reality	was	ever	made	by	realists?	(Flanaghan	2014:	22)	
	
Cold	whispers	under	the	warmth	of	the	hallway.	I	fetch	my	bicycle	from	the	garage,	
mount	in	the	road,	and	freewheel	down	a	terraced	street	to	work.	Daylight	is	
struggling	up	across	the	city	as	if	through	smoke.	
The	top	floor	of	the	education	block	of	the	university	is	quiet	on	the	Friday.	
Trainee	teachers	are	home	polishing	lesson	plans	in	anticipation	of	their	first	school	
experience,	and	children	are	preparing	for	Halloween	at	the	end	of	the	half	term	
holiday.	It	is	a	sensible	time	to	hold	a	vivai.	
I	check	the	room	and	see	it	is	already	organised	with	a	seat	for	the	candidate	
close	to	the	entrance	and	two	more	opposite	for	the	examiners.	Behind	the	
candidate	is	a	place	for	the	supervisor,	so	there	can	be	no	eye	contact	or	
collaboration.	As	chair	of	proceedings,	my	role	will	be	to	ensure	fair	play.	There	is	no	
place	set	for	me,	so	I	pull	up	a	seat	at	one	side,	like	a	tennis	umpire.	And	there	is	no	
water.	Someone	always	forgets	the	water.		
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I	turn	to	fetch	a	jug,	catch	sight	of	the	cityscape	and	stop,	beguiled.		Your	eyes	
just	have	to	drink	that	panorama,	from	the	beacon	on	the	hill	ridge,	across	
warehouses	and	dockland,	over	the	blitzed	and	rebuilt	medieval	centre,	tracing	the	
spear	tips	of	steeples	up	again	to	houses	that	teeter	over	the	shunting	yards	of	the	
station.		
Then	I	look	inward,	returned	in	time	to	before	this	classroom	was	built.	I	am	
standing	sharing	a	cigarette	in	the	technician’s	room	beside	the	same	window	with	
the	same	single-glazed	pane	set	in	its	age-warped	metal	frame	and	hear	the	sigh	of	
air	through	the	seal	it	will	never	make	and	the	story	of	the	man	who	jumped	out	
here	in	some	state	of	mortal	despair	the	full	four	floors	into	the	parking	lot	below	
and	lived.		
Minutes	later,	downstairs	by	the	desk	of	an	administrator,	I	scan	hurriedly	the	
examiners’	preliminary	reports.	At	this	juncture	each	is	suggesting	a	pass,	subject	to	
confirmation	according	to	the	outcome	of	discussion	during	the	viva	itself.	The	
external	is	familiar,	since	she	has	examined	on	a	number	of	occasions	for	our	
doctorate	of	education	programme.	She	has	a	well-deserved	reputation	in	the	field	
of	qualitative	inquiry	and	is	known	to	be	rigorous.	She	enjoys	creative	research	
writing	that	takes	a	different	tack	to	the	habitual,	though	it	will	need	to	get	the	
basics	right—she’ll	certainly	pick	up	on	that.	And	the	internal—need	to	be	careful	
here—likes,	let	us	say,	anything	that	lines	his	nest.	Operates	at	something	of	a	
tangent.	As	I	have	heard	it	remarked	on	more	than	one	occasion	in	the	post-viva	
debrief,	‘I	don’t	object	to	the	point	he	was	making,	but	has	he	actually	read	my	
work?’		
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Sonya,	the	candidate,	I	don’t	really	know—a	part-time	student	I	think	I	taught	
on	one	of	those	modules	run	like	a	variety	show	where	eight	different	people	turn	
up	over	two	days	to	‘talk	about	research’.	Intriguing	title,	mind	you—‘The	Door	and	
the	Dark:	A	ghosted	inquiry’.	Presented	as	a	layered	text	apparently.	I	hazard	a	guess	
at	what	that	might	entail.	Ghosted	inquiry	is	a	new	one	to	me.	
The	phone	rings	somewhere	off	and	there	is	a	muffled	conversation,	followed	
by,	‘Well,	let's	hope	it’s	all	OK.’	It	transpires	that	the	supervisor	has	been	clobbered	
by	a	car	on	her	way	in—her	leg	is	a	mess	and	the	bike	is	a	write-off.	Possibly	
concussed	and	waiting	in	the	Infirmary	for	x-rays.	And	this	is	supposed	to	be	a	
cyclist-friendly	city!		
So	Sonya	Morris	will	be	all	on	her	own	today.	Barely	thirty	minutes	until	the	
viva	starts	and	she	must	be	fretting	outside	her	supervisor's	office.	One	of	the	admin	
team	heads	off	up	the	stairs	to	explain	the	situation.	Not	sure	if	I	should	get	
involved,	so	pick	up	the	Dictaphone	and	some	plastic	cups	and	go	to	fill	that	jug.		
At	eleven	o'clock	I	am	waiting	in	the	viva	room	when	Sonya	appears,	smiles	
cautiously	and	says,	‘What	a	to-do,	eh?	Oh	well,	I'm	sure	I'll	survive.’	We	must	be	
fairly	close	in	age,	middish-fifties.	Warm	to	her	immediately.	Stretch	out	a	hand	to	
introduce	myself	when	the	examiners	enter	the	room.		
The	internal,	Don	Roper,	scowls.	‘You	should	be	waiting	outside—we	haven't	
given	you	permission	to	come	in	yet!’	
I	reply,	‘It's	all	right,	Don,	you	were	slightly	late,	and…’	
The	external	steps	across	Roper.	‘Good	morning,	Sonya,	I'm	Abby	Farfield.	
Must	be	unsettling	for	you	that	your	supervisor	couldn't	make	it.	Look,	let's	make	
the	best	of	this	and	just	get	on	with	the	main	event,	which	is	talking	about	your	very	
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engaging	research.	How	about	you	sit	over	there	and	Don	and	I	will	sit	here?	Are	we	
all	alright	with	that?	Now,	Malcolm,	would	you	get	the	formalities	over	with	and	
explain	to	Sonya	how	this	process	works,	and	also	figure	out	how	to	switch	on	that	
Dictaphone	so	we	have	a	record	to	refer	back	to	in	case	we	need	it.’	
Five	minutes	later,	the	opening	question	from	the	external	comes	as	no	
surprise:	‘Just	to	get	us	into	the	flow,	could	you	explain	to	us	the	backstory	to	the	
research—how	it	all	came	about—and	in	particular	what	your	title	signifies?’	
Sonya	relaxes,	her	hand	rising	off	the	cover	of	her	dissertation,	which	is	tagged	
with	slips	of	Post-it.	Clearly	she	has	rehearsed	the	possible	questions	and	marked	out	
key	quotations.		
‘Let	me	start	with	the	title,	since	explaining	that	will	contextualise	the	problem	
I	am	addressing	and	also	help	to	frame	the	research	project.	‘The	Door	and	the	Dark’	
is	a	play	on	two	titles—that	of	a	poem	and	that	of	a	collection	of	poems.’	
She	flicks	to	a	page	in	her	dissertation.	‘Robert	Frost	has	a	poem	called	‘The	
Door	in	the	Dark’	(1928),	which	describes	walking	into	a	door	in	the	dark	of	night,	
which:		
hit	me	a	blow	in	the	head	so	hard	
I	had	my	native	simile	jarred.	
So	people	and	things	don't	pair	any	more	
With	what	they	used	to	pair	with	before.	
‘Bit	of	a	tongue-twister,	I	know,	and	when	I	first	read	it	I	did	look	twice	to	see	
whether	it	said	‘simile’	or	‘smile’.	I	was	grabbed	by	the	conceit,	in	a	literary	sense,	of	
double	vision	that	Frost	is	re-presenting	here…’	
‘Don’t	you	mean,	representing?’	Don	Roper	asks.	
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‘No,	as	I	said,	re-presenting—making	present	again—how	writing	creates	our	
imagination	in	the	present	(Denzin	1995,	Lapadat	and	Lindsay	1999).		
‘Those	two	different	uses	of	‘pair	with’	in	the	final	line	are,	I	would	argue,	a	
deliberate	doubling.’	She	pauses.	‘And	also	somehow	troubling—a	circumstance	in	
which	‘people	and	things’	no	longer	quite	fit.	This	resonated	with	my	life	story.’	
Abby	Farfield	asks,	‘And	the	other	poem?’	
‘Seamus	Heaney—his	second	collection,	Door	into	the	Dark	(1969:	19),	which	is	
a	quotation	from	the	opening	line	of	‘The	Forge’:	‘All	I	know	is	a	door	into	the	dark.’	
‘He	is	remembering	being	a	boy	back	in	Bellaghy,	County	Derry	and	making	
sense	of	what	is	in	the	gloom	behind	the	forge	door.	It	is	another	subtle	effect	of	
doubling,	this	time	playing	off	sense	and	imagination	against	time—Heaney	employs	
a	historical	present,	‘All	I	know	is,’	and	this	brings	his	past,	an	event	of	his	youth,	
perpetually	into	the	now.	But	even	in	the	now—and	this	to	me	is	the	beauty	of	the	
poem’s	imaginative	projection—what	is	present	is	forged	by	memory:	
The	anvil	must	be	somewhere	in	the	centre,	
Horned	as	a	unicorn	
‘The	anvil	must	be…’	Do	you	see?	The	poem	acts	out	re-presentation	so	the	
boundary	between	what	is	real	and	what	is	imagined	is	blurred.	Maybe	here,	like	
Frost	says,	the	simile	of	reality	has	been	jarred.	Of	course,	Heaney	traverses	the	real	
and	the	fantastic	when	the	anvil	becomes	‘horned	as	a	unicorn’.’	
‘Couldn’t	that	just	be	a	figure	of	speech?’	Don	Roper	again.	
‘That’s	it.	That’s	exactly	it,	an	appearance	or	attitude	of	speaking,	of	making	a	
world	in	words.	That’s	what	‘figure’	means.	Look	it	upii.	And	did	you	know	that	
‘figure’,	‘fiction’	and	‘feign’	share	the	same	Latin	root,	fingere?	(Bruner	1998:	19)’	
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‘Meaning?’	
‘Meaning	‘to	form	or	shape’.’	
‘Not	clear	where	we	are	going	here?’	
‘Well,	this	is	my	argument—the	dissertation	is	about	re-presenting	experience	
through	memory.	Shaping	memory	is	the	work	of	fiction—making	worlds	out	of	
words,	figures,	ideas.	We	can	only	look	into	the	past	as	if	into	the	dark	behind	a	
door,	and	we	illuminate	that	dark	with	words—meanings	we	fashion	from	different	
kinds	of	sign	available	to	us.’	She	pauses.	‘In	discourse.’	Sonya	hesitates	again.	
‘Maybe.	Haven’t	totally	made	up	my	mind	on	that.’	
‘And	why	do	you	think	we	make	these	meanings?’	Abby	Farfield	prompts.	
‘Well,	it	is	inherent	to	the	practice	of	living.	Which	is	why	I	am	hesitating,	
because	there	isn’t	a	perfect	match	between	being	and	discoursing.	I	know	that	it	is	
argued	that	discourse	allows	us	to	make	meaning,	and	therefore	it	is	the	tool	we	
create	historically	and	culturally	that	lets	us	be	ourselves	(Barthes	1975).	But…’		
She	stops	herself.	Looks	past	us	all	and	out	of	the	window.	
‘But,	what?’	
‘But,	it’s	all	too,	too…	definitive—you	know,	opening	line	of	St.	John’s	Gospel:	
‘In	the	beginning	was	the	Word	and	the	word	was,’	et	cetera.	I	don’t	believe	in	
nothing	but	words,	or	in	words	over	all.	What	about	us—surely	we	are	more	than	
purveyors	of	meaning?	I	mean,	at	our	human	best	we	shine	a	little	light,	but	at	our	
worst	we	seem	to	eclipse	even	a	glimmer	of	goodness.	Maybe	we	are	made	more	of	
dark	than	light.	Sorry,	probably	misquoting	Milton	there.’		
‘This	is	all	very	literary	and	philosophical—bordering	on	the	arcane,	even.’	
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‘I’ll	take	‘arcane’,	Dr.	Roper.	In	Italian	un’	arca	is	a	chest,	or	an	ark.	A	place	of	
safekeeping,	where	in	medieval	times	we	kept	grain.	Also	a	container	of	the	holies.	
The	arcane	is	where	we	store	physical	and	spiritual	succour.’		
She	laughs	to	herself.	‘Sorry.	I	get	like	this—too	much	time	on	my	own.’	Then	
she	is	off	again.	It	is	like	watching	a	yacht	tacking	against	a	stiff	wind.		
‘Do	you	remember	the	Fourth	Thesis	on	Feuerbach?’	
Sonya	reads:	
Feuerbach	resolves	the	religious	essence	into	the	humaniii	essence.	But	the	
human	essence	is	no	abstraction	inherent	in	each	single	individual.	In	its	reality	
it	is	the	ensemble	of	the	social	relations.	(Marx	and	Engels	1970:	122)	
‘Interesting.	So?’		Don	Roper	asks.	
‘So,	everything!	Humankind	creates	gods	to	people	the	dark	inside	us,	to	give	
us	a	creative	divinity,	and	to	provide	an	architect	for	the	void	beyond	ourselves—
remember	the	‘darknesse	that	was	upon	the	face	of	the	deepeiv’,	in	the	Bible?	We	
create	metaphysical	beings	because	we	are	lonely	and	world-weary,	but	in	reality	
this	is	us	selving	ourselves.	Maybe	that	should	stand	as	a	definition	of	narrative	
inquiry!’	
‘A	remarkable	way	of	putting	it,	for	sure.	Though	that’s	not	quite	what	you	
write	in	your	dissertation.’	
‘I’m	just	trying	to	answer	your	questions.	Am	I	doing	something	wrong?’	
‘Not	at	all.	You	are	highly	persuasive,	poetic	even.’		
‘My	first	degree	is	in	English	literature,	so	I	tend	to	equate	the	symbolic	with	
the	social.	Sometimes	I	wonder	whether	literature	hasn’t	been	doing	social	science	
forever.	Isn’t	it	all	imagination,	even	if	it's	sociological?’	
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Again	she	reads:	‘This	is	C.	Wright	Mills:		
The	sociological	imagination	enables	its	possessor	to	understand	the	larger	
historical	sense	in	terms	of	its	meaning	for	the	inner	life	and	the	external	
careers	of	a	variety	of	individuals.	(1959:	5)	
Don	Roper	intervenes,	‘But	Wright	Mills	is	advocating	a	critical	method,	a	
scientific	way	of	interrogating	society.	The	literary	doesn’t	overrule	the	scientific.’	
Abby	Farfield	asks,	‘Isn’t	Wright	Mills’	argument	that	we	need	a	critical	and	
social	method	to	dispel	the	false	consciousness	that	arises	from	an	individualistic	
perspective?	Doesn’t	he	explain	sociological	imagination	as	what	‘enables	us	to	
grasp	history	and	biography	and	the	relations	between	the	two’	(1959:	6)?’	
‘And	doesn’t	literature	give	us	something	similar?’	Sonya	responds.	‘Doesn’t,	
for	example,	the	life	story	of	Tess	in	Hardy’s	Tess	of	the	d’Urbervilles	(1891)	grasp	
unforgettably	the	intersection	of	history,	class	and	gender?	How	a	good	woman	is	
driven	to	murder	by	the	predatory	actions	of	a	so-called	gentleman?’	
‘Yes,	but	Tess	is	a	fictional	character—a	product	of	Hardy’s	imagination.	That’s	
hardly	scientific	or	strictly	speaking	sociological.’	Roper’s	voice	becomes	agitated.	
‘And	Hardy’s	imagination	is	a	product	of	what?	Fairy	dust?	No	woman	was	ever	
defiled	by	a	member	of	the	ruling	class—that’s	just	imagination	is	it?	Sounds	like	
false	consciousness	to	me!’	
Dr	Roper	looks	angry,	but	says	nothing.	
‘To	return	to	my	original	question,’	says	Abby	Farfield,	‘What	is	the	backstory	
here?	We	haven’t	yet	resolved	the	issue	of	why	this	research	is	pertinent.’	
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There	is	a	notable	pause,	before	Sonya	says,	‘Something	happened	in	my	
family,	a	long	time	ago.	Something	that	was	never	really	discussed,	that	I	found	out	
about—a	skeleton	in	the	cupboard,	in	a	manner	of	speaking.’	
‘And	why	is	this	a	project	appropriate	to	doctoral	research	in	the	field	of	
education?’	
‘Writing	about	the	past	is	like	writing	in	the	dark	(van	Manen	2002).	I	know	
that	sounds	like	a	cliché.	In	fact,	it	is	a	big	problem	for	inquiry,	so	I	argue	that	this	
issue	is	a	worthy	topic	because	it	gets	at	the	methodology	of	how	we	reclaim	
situations.		
‘The	problem	is	that	the	past	is	always	imbricated	by	the	present.	Therefore,	
the	past	is	being	made	up.’	Sonya	dips	into	her	dissertation.	‘Let	me	find	it—this	is	
what	Järvinen	(2009)	argues,	drawing	on	George	Herbert	Mead	(1932/1959):	
From	the	point	of	view	of	the	present,	there	is	no	objective	past	in	the	history	
of	individuals,	institutions	or	societies.	There	is	no	past	to	be	captured,	
understood	and	described	in	its	pure	essence.	There	is	only	a	past	-	or	a	
plurality	of	pasts	–	constructed	from	the	point	of	view	of	an	ever-changing	
present.	(Järvinen	2009:	320)	
‘Järvinen’s	argument	is	that	the	past	does	not	cause	the	present,	since	when	
that	past	experience	occurred	it	was	not	causally	connected	to	any	present.	The	
present	is	causally	connected	to	the	past	by	virtue	of	us	always	being	in	the	now—
consciousness	and	being	are	only	constituted	as	presence.	This	is	what	I	figure	as	the	
(k)now—bracket-k-bracket-n-o-w—in	order	to	show	how	knowledge	is	constructed	
in	the	moment	of	knowing’	
‘Yes,	I	saw	that.	Clever.’	
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Sonya	carries	on,	‘Järvinen	makes	this	terrific	observation:	
The	present	is	always	in	some	sense	new	and	abrupt,	but	once	it	has	occurred,	
we	start	on	the	arduous	task	of	reconstructing	the	past	in	terms	of	it.	The	
abruptness	of	the	present	is	mitigated	by	our	new	perspective	on	the	past,	a	
perspective	from	which	the	emergent	becomes	understandable.	(Järvinen	
2009:	323)	
‘Järvinen	helps	me	organise	the	emergence	of	any	past	through	a	present	
consciousness,	a	(k)now,	which	of	course	is	never	a	single	moment	and	never	a	
single	strand	of	knowing.	We	are	always	stuck	in	the	middle	of	the	process	of	
retrieving	the	past	in	the	(k)now,	which	is	always	slipping	backwards	and	away.	I	
suggest	that	we	think	of	this	process	as	a	fair	description	of	memory	work.	I’m	
arguing	that	we	need	to	educate	ourselves	about	the	practice	of	memory	work—its	
methodology,	its	doing.	So	that’s	my	claim	to	what	is	educational	in	the	research.’	
‘OK.	This	conversation	has	already	anticipated	some	of	our	questions.	Let’s	just	
explore	further	your	theoretical	framework,	then—tell	us	who	else’s	writing	you	
review?’	
‘Well,	Derrida—and,	to	be	frank,	I	find	Derrida	difficult.	I	came	at	him	through	
a	reading	on	one	of	our	EdD	units	on	narrative	research.	Carol	Rambo	Ronai	
introduced	me	to	the	idea	of	a	‘layered	account’,	which	basically	describes	how:		
impressions	from	the	world	become	internalized	and	layered	on	the	existing	
stocks	of	knowledge,	shifting	how	that	knowledge	will	affect	current	and	
future	lived	experience.	(Rambo	Ronai	1999:	115)	
‘So	through	the	process	of	writing	layering	revisits	something	of	the	
psychological	process	of	accounting	for	an	experience	that	Järvinen	explains.	It	picks	
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up	on	the	way	in	which	the	physical	process,	rather	like	figure-drawing	in	Rambo	
Ronai’s	explanation,	is	full	of	erasures—edits,	crossings-out,	ditched	attempts.	As	
she	puts	it:	‘a	constant	process	of	correction’	(1999:	115).		
‘And	here’s	the	clincher,	for	me:	
Writing	in	layers	reflects	the	structure	of	consciousness.	As	each	layer	of	text	is	
superimposed	on	the	others,	each	layer	contributes	to	the	understanding	of	
the	other	layers	as	well	as	to	the	overall	picture	of	social	life	that	the	text	
conveys.	(1999:	116)	
‘The	layering	process	is	really	attractive,	but	I	needed	to	be	more	sure	of	
myself	with	regard	to	the	theory	Rambo	Ronai	is	drawing	from.	She	references	Of	
Grammatology,	(Derrida	1976:	1991),	so	I	looked	it	up.	
‘We’d	been	talking	in	class	about	how	a	number	of	papers	in	narrative	and	
qualitative	inquiry	stress	a	postmodernist	approach,	without	really	situating	that	in	a	
philosophical	tradition.	We	don’t	find	out	what	the	postmodernists	are	arguing	
about.		
‘Actually,	Rambo	Ronai’s	debt	to	Derrida	is	neatly	explained,	and	we	all	really	
liked	the	way	she	produces	provocative	layered	accounts—for	instance,	the	way	she	
summons	up	her	grandmother,	Anny	Re	(Rambo,	2005).	In	this	paper,	Rambo	(by	
now	she	has	dropped	the	Ronai	surname)	draws	a	connection	between	the	work	of	
consciousness	and	that	of	identity:	
Identity,	a	process	dependent	on	consciousness,	likewise,	is	always	left	with	
traces	of	what	went	before.	Every	identity	we	have	experienced	is	neither	fully	
present	nor	fully	erased.	Accumulating	impressions	from	these	identities	lie	
beneath	the	surface	influencing	the	creation	of	the	emergent	picture	of	self.	
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These	impressions,	as	they	build	up,	provide	a	relatively	stable	sense	of	self.	
(Rambo	2005:	564)	
	
‘So	this	is	leading	us	towards	a	stable	self	that	we	identify	through	writing,	
which	I	think	is	another	way	of	describing	how	the	social	sits	behind	the	literary	
text—how	writing	re-presents	aspects	of	social	reality.	Writing	allows	us	to	be—this	
is	not	a	direct	connection	with	reality	but	with	a	sense	of	being-in-the-world.	
‘Derrida	(1991)	is	responding	to	Heidegger—so	his	argument	concerns	the	
nature	of	being,	ontology,	and	the	way	writing	grasps	or	textualises	over	time	some	
meaning	of	ourselves	that	spoken	language,	being	ephemeral,	doesn’t.	Although	this	
grasping	for	significance	is	always	diffident	and	impermanent.	
‘As	I	understand	it,	Derrida	is	having	a	go	at	structuralist	accounts	of…’	
Don	Roper	shifts	uncomfortably	on	his	chair	and	looks	at	Abby	Farfield.	‘Do	we	
really	need	to	go	into	this	much	detail?	We	still	haven’t	got	to	the	nub	of	the	
dissertation,	or	even	answered	our	first	question,	and	we	are	already	a	good	way	
through	the	viva.’	
‘I’ll	be	quick,’	Sonya	replies.	‘Probably	the	foundational	paper	in	narrative	
research	is	Roland	Barthes’	‘An	introduction	to	the	structural	analysis	of	narrative’	
(1975v),	where,	following	Saussure,	he	relates	the	structure	of	the	sentence	to	the	
structure	of	a	higher	order,	called	discourse:		
Discourse	would	then	be	a	large	‘sentence’	(whose	units	do	not	necessarily	
have	to	be	sentences)	in	the	same	way	that	a	sentence,	allowing	for	certain	
specifications,	is	a	small	‘discourse.’	(Barthes	1975:	240)	
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‘This	is	all	in	pursuit	of	presenting	the	origin	of	language	within	some	idea	of	an	
organizing	system,	so	the	argument	being	made	is	that	humankind	produces	a	
‘secondary,	self-multiplying’	system,	a	language	of	language,	or	a	tool	to	make	a	
tool,	as	Barthes	explains	(1975:	240).	Meaning	isn’t	made	by	sentences	alone,	or	by	
discourse	alone,	but	in	their	interplay.	So	Barthes	suggests	that	meaning	‘does	not	lie	
‘at	the	end’	of	the	narrative,	but	straddles	it’	(1975:	243).’	
Roper	has	stopped	making	notes	and	is	gazing,	glass-eyed,	at	the	window.	
Outside	the	wind	is	rising	and	rain	is	beginning	to	tap	against	the	pane.	
‘OK,	OK—overload	of	theory.	Basically	Derrida	is	arguing	that	Barthes’	idea	of	a	
superordinate	organizing	system	returns	us	to	some	metaphysical	explanation	of	
being,	driven	by	a	model	of	spoken	language	that	assumes	that	signs	sit	out	there	in	
the	ether,	so	to	speak,	and	guide	our	every	utterance.	We’ve	recreated	a	god-like	
explanation	that	seems	to	lie	beyond	ourselves.	
Just	like	I	explained	with	Järvinen	earlier,	the	past	is	not	a	remote	actuality,	so	
all	signs	are	fractured	and	broken	and	are	made	in	the	present	and	in	the	moment.	
Writing	is	a	better	model,	at	least	as	a	metaphor,	to	get	at	the	actuality	of	being-in-
language,	and	of	knowing-in-the-now,	because	it	holds	us	to	the	idea	of	having	to	
make	our	meaning	in	linear	time,	of	writing	and	re-writing	ourselves,	of	always	
escaping	any	origin,	of	leaving	traces	and	erasures	in	our	wake,	and	constantly	
covering	them	over	without	hope	of	recovery.		
‘Derrida	has	this	wonderful	expression	for	writing,	‘as	an	adventure	of	
relationships	between	the	face	and	the	hand’	(1991:	47-48).	Writing	allows	an	
adventure	of	identity-making—the	power	to	make	beings	from	ourselves	whilst	
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finding	out	about	ourselves.	And	that’s	the	adventure	on	which	I	set	out,	which	ends	
up	in	something	of	a	ghost	story.’	
Sonya	stops,	looks	relieved,	and	reaches	for	her	water.	
‘Perhaps,’	says	Abby	Farfield,	‘Now	would	be	a	good	time	to	talk	about	‘The	
Dead	Letters’.’	
At	which	I	make	my	only	effective	intervention	in	the	whole	proceedings.	
‘Is	there	any	way—and	I	apologise	for	seeming	a	bear	of	very	little	brain,	but	
the	chair	of	viva	is	not	given	a	copy	of	the	dissertation—I	might	have	explained	what	
it	is	all	about?	In	a	nutshell?’	
Sonya	drains	her	cup.	‘Of	course.	It’s	about…’	
The	rain	slaps	the	window	and	a	low	howl	issues	from	the	frame.	
‘This	is	all	rather	dramatic,	isn’t	it?’	Roper	remarks.	‘Perfect	setting	for	a	ghost	
story!’	
‘Chapter	4	centres	around	a	series	of	letters	that	I	received	one	day,	in	a	
bundle	marked	‘Dead	Letters’.	The	letters	had	been	sent	to	an	address	I	left	years	
ago	and	were	forwarded,	until	it	seems	the	trail	ran	out.	Then	at	some	point,	the	
Post	Office	identified	my	current	address	and…	and…	there	they	were.’	
‘And	who	are	the	letters	from?’	I	ask.	
‘The	letters	are	from	someone	in	my	family.	From	two	prisons	up	north—I	
won’t	say	where.’	
She	looks	down	at	her	hands,	then	raises	her	palms	and	rests	them	over	her	
eyes,	scrunching	the	heels	into	her	cheekbones	as	if	erasing	tears.	
	‘Later,	when	I’ve	worked	out	the	story—a	horrible	bloody	story—I	wish	I	had	
burnt	them	the	day	they	arrived	and	then	they	might	never	have	haunted	me.	
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‘But,	for	now,	I	don’t	know	what	to	do.	So	I	don’t	do	anything.		
‘For	five	years	they	sit	in	a	big	brown	envelope	in	a	drawer.	I	try	to	forget	
them.	I	go	to	work.	I	come	home.	And	every	time	I	go	near	that	desk	in	the	spare	
room	I	look	at	that	closed	drawer	and	think	about	those	letters.	
‘One	day	I	decide	enough	is	enough.	I’ve	started	my	doctorate	and	I	want	to	
use	the	spare	room	properly	as	my	study.	So	I	open	the	brown	envelope	and	arrange	
the	letters	according	to	the	dates	franked	on	them.	
‘I	slit	the	top	of	the	first.	There	is	no	address,	and	no	‘Dear	Sonya’,	just	a	single	
side	of	writing.	
‘At	first	the	forms	swim	there	without	meaning.	All	I	can	imagine	is	this	
bastard’s	face.	I	am	shouting,	‘I	don't	know	you	and	I	don't	want	to	know.’	I	picture	
excuses	tumbling	out,	and	as	fast	as	they	spill,	I	deny	them.		
‘Then	the	words	on	the	letter	gel.	It's	a	description	of	lights	out	in	a	cell.	
Throughout	a	prison	block	the	lights	are	switched	off.	Beyond	the	cell	window	the	
dark	falls.	But	there	remains	a	crack	of	light	seeping	through	the	hatch	in	the	door.	
‘The	writing	is	crafted,	clearly	fashioned	for	effect	and	forged	over	time.	At	a	
symbolic	level	it	suggests	an	urge	to	forget,	or,	more	accurately,	it	captures	a	failure	
to	forget.	There	is	no	final	darkness	of	forgetting,	and	there	is	always	this	sliver	of	
light	searching	out	the	cell.	
‘These	letters	are	written	like	illuminations.	Never	the	whole	story,	or	the	
whole	truth,	but	glimpses,	incidents,	projections,	one	might	say,	in	which	those	
shafts	of	light	from	behind	a	dark	door	illuminate	a	well	of	being.	More	exactly	the	
being	that	was,	which	is	a	kind	of	not-being—present	absence,	perhaps.	Definitely	
somewhere	in	between	being	and	not	being.	I	suppose	in	cinematic	terms	it	would	
	 16	
be	like	seeing	the	shadow	projected	by	a	body	that	is	out	of	shot.	Or	in	a	paranormal	
sense,	an	apparition.’	
‘You	never	give	us	the	letters,	though,	do	you?’	Abby	Farfield	says.	‘Why	is	
that?’	
‘Well,	I	give	you	my	take	on	them—their	appearance	to	me—the	ghostings,	as	I	
call	them.’	
‘Explain	“ghosting”	for	us.	Why	is	a	“ghosting”	a	substitute	for	the	thing	itself?’	
‘Just	as	a	word	is	never	the	thing	itself,	but	its	name,	and	an	aspect	of	our	
world	of	meaning,	so	the	text	is	never	the	act	itself	but	a	similitude.	Remember	
Frost’s	simile	that	gets	jarred	in	the	poem	I	quoted	earlier,	and	how	people	and	
things	don’t	match	anymore?	That’s	the	impression—no,	impression	is	wrong	
because	it	conveys	a	sense	of	being	acted	on,	pressed	on	from	without,	and	this	
didn’t	feel	exterior—maybe	phenomenon	is	better,	since	it	points	at	the	act	itself	
and	the	way	it	seems.	Doesn’t	phenomenon	mean	“appearance”	in	Greek?’	For	a	
moment	she	looks	worried,	as	if	she	has	backed	herself	into	a	corner	and	can’t	yet	
see	her	way	out.	
‘Carry	on—you’re	making	sense—go	back	to	the	idea	behind	ghosting,	
possibly?’	Abby	Farfield	helps	out.	
‘Alright—I’m	going	to	have	to	have	a	run	at	this.	
‘Behind	Derrida	is	Heidegger,	who	has	this	obsession	with	word	meanings,	
which	I	rather	admire.	This	probably	comes	from	the	tradition	of	philology,	or	word-
history.	For	Heidegger,	language	is	more	than	communication:	
But	language	is	not	only	and	not	primarily	an	audible	and	written	expression	of	
what	 is	 to	be	communicated.	 It	not	only	puts	 forth	 in	words	and	 statements	
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what	 is	 overtly	 or	 covertly	 intended	 to	 be	 communicated;	 language	 alone	
brings	beings	as	beings	into	the	open	for	the	first	time.	(Heidegger	1993:	198)	
‘Root	words	are	expressions	of	philosophy,	of	how	we	struggle	to	know	who	
we	are.	What	I	take	from	Heidegger	is	the	idea	that	something	fundamental	about	
our	being	lies	in	the	roots	of	the	words	we	use	to	express	our	existence.	The	roots	of	
some	words	open	out	what	is	meaningful	to	us	in	our	histories	as	beings.	
‘More	than	what	a	word	means,	I	want	to	understand	its	trajectory—how	it	
has	built	up	and	shifted	significance	over	time,	and	how	that	might	reflect	
differences	in	how	we	understand	ourselves	and	our	position	in	the	world.’	
	‘The	word,	‘ghost’	is	a	case	in	point.	Look	in	the	OED	Online,	and	you	will	see	
the	etymological	speculation	that	the	root	comes	into	Old	German	from	Sanskrit,	or	
Indo-European	heritage,	and	derives	from	a	word	meaning	“fury,	anger”.	In	non-
Germanic	languages	the	sense	might	go	back	to	that	of	“to	wound,	tear,	pull	to	
pieces”vi.	So	“ghost”	isn’t	a	word	that	our	ancestors	believed	reflects	phantasms	and	
figures	of	the	imagination,	but	one	which	channels	raw	emotion	and	violent	action—
the	kind	of	event	on	which	one	would	look	aghast.’	
‘When	I	reflected	back,	after	opening	and	reading	the	letters,	I	realised	that	a	
ghost	was	strong	in	them.	I	could	piece	together	a	train	of	actions	and	the	events	full	
of	fury—an	A-Z	of	cause,	crime	and	punishment.	
‘In	turn,	“ghosting”	felt	right	to	describe	the	process	of	responding	to	the	being	
behind	the	events	the	letters	convey—especially	my	anger	at	a	carnage	that	could	
have	ceased	at	any	time	if	some	self-control	had	just	been	found.’	
Sonya	stares	out	of	the	window	into	the	grey	downpour.	
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I	shift	on	my	seat.	There	is	a	nasty	draft	and	appositely	the	viva	seems	to	have	
blown	itself	out.	
‘So,’	I	ask,	‘These	“dead	letters”	that	Dr,	Farfield	says	you	didn’t	actually	give	in	
the	dissertation—sorry,	but	I	don’t	think	I	have	quite	got	to	the	bottom—well,	how	
do	we	know	what	actually	happened?’	
Roper	laughs.	‘Wrapped	in	mystery,	those	letters.	I	mean—there's	no	real	
evidence	where	they	come	from	or	if	they	even	exist.	There	are	no	facsimiles	or	
anything	that	validates	this	correspondence.’	
Abby	Farfield	turns	to	him.	‘Are	you	raising	a	problem	concerning	ethical	
procedure,	Don?	You	seem	to	be	insinuating	there	is	a	question	to	answer	here,	so	
maybe	you	should	carry	it	through.’	
However,	Sonya	seems	more	than	ready	for	the	question.	‘I	know	it	requires	
some	suspension	of	disbelief,	but	I	needed	in	some	way	to	disguise	the	originals,	not	
open	them	to	public	scrutiny.	I	do	have	ethical	reasons	for	not	divulging	that	
information	directly.	I	don’t	see	any	reason	in	leaving	a	paper	trail	that	could	lead	
back	to,	or	upset,	anyone.		
‘I	do	give	the	reader	a	sequence	of	virtual	components	for	a	crime—
infatuation,	rejection,	rage,	rampage,	realisation,	remorse,	retribution	and	remand.	I	
also	explain	the	Deleuzian	theory	whereby	memory	actualizes	events	by	drawing	on	
virtuality:		
In	memory	the	past	exists	virtually	as	a	collection	of	past	instants	or	percepts	
in	a	state	of	'relaxation,'	i.e.,	in	a	condition	in	which	these	percepts	are	not	
organized	in	any	particular	way	with	relation	to	each	other.	They	exist	as	a	
dissociated	set	of	singularities.	That	is,	they	are	virtual.	Furthermore,	this	past	
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is	not	something	apart	from	the	present	but	something	that	is	contained	in	the	
present.	The	entire	past	(as	memory)	is	part	of	each	present.	Recollection	is	a	
process	of	actualizing	this	virtuality,	of	differentially	repeating	the	percepts	
along	a	particular	series,	a	series	that	arranges	or	organizes	them	in	a	
particular	manner,	a	way	of	bringing	the	past	to	bear	on	the	present.	(Colwell	
1997:	¶11)	
‘I	do,	therefore,	signal	a	relationship	that	points	you	in	the	direction	of	the	
objectivity	of	the	events,	although	I	do	not	give	actual	events.		
‘I'm	not	sure	that	validity	is	an	issue.	I	mean,	that’s	the	conundrum,	isn’t	it—
how	does	one	validate	a	ghost?’		
Roper	responds,	‘Oh,	I	don’t	know—there	is	something	about	this	ghosting	
business	that	disturbs	me.’	He	laughs.	‘I	mean,	accepted,	Sonya—the	paper	trail	
point—public	getting	hold	of—well,	I	can	see	that—but	isn’t	there	still	an	issue	of	
veracity,	even	if	we	can’t	stretch	to	validation?	Why	rewrite	the	letters?	Doesn’t	that	
damage	their	truthfulness,	or	displace	some	element	of	their	reality?	Why	not	just	
leave	them	as	they	are?	Why	all	the	literary	sleight	of	hand?	It	all	seems	
unnecessarily	postmodern	and	contrived	to	me.	Sorry,	Abby,	I	held	back	from	
mentioning	it	in	my	report.’	
‘Postmodern	isn’t	a	term	I	employ,	and	that	is	deliberate.	There’s	a	good	part	
of	my	penultimate	chapter	that	deals	with	my	disquiet	with	postmodernism.’	
Abby	Farfield	sighs,	‘This	really	isn’t	going	the	way	I’d	hoped.	Perhaps,	Don,	we	
could	stick	to	the	questions	we	agreed?’	She	eyes	him,	quite	fiercely	in	my	opinion.	
Roper	sets	his	jaw,	but	says	nothing.		
	 20	
‘Sonya,	explain	the	reasoning	behind	Chapter	4,	where	we	read	your	ghostings	
of	the	actual	letters,	and	then	your	replies.	Your	methodological	reasoning,	I	mean.’	
	‘I	needed	some	way	of	foregrounding	the	subjective	lens	of	inquiry	and	
backgrounding	the	objective.	I	don’t	want	to	oppose	subjective	and	objective	here,	
so	I	take	Ratner’s	concern	seriously:	
Objectivism	is	the	highest	form	of	respect	for	the	subjects	we	are	studying.	It	
respects	their	psychological	reality	as	something	meaningful	and	important	
which	must	be	accurately	comprehended.	(Ratner	2002:	¶14)	
‘However,	if	the	objective	view	prioritises	the	kind	of	validation	and	
verification	issues	that	Dr.	Roper	is	raising,	then,	given	my	ethical	concerns	and	
needing	to	find	a	way	around,	I	reasoned	that	drawing	attention	to	the	subjective—
that	is,	placing	the	potential	reader	alongside	the	researcher—would	loosen	the	
bond	with	what	actually	happened	and	strengthen	it	in	terms	of	how	I	interpret	the	
letters.		
‘So,	my	ghostings	of	the	letters	denote	the	angry	remains	of	what	I	feel	this	
other	person	feels	in	relation	to	what	has	been	done.	In	turn,	this	raises	other	
spectres—that	is,	the	anger	I	feel	at	re-voicing	another’s	anger.		
‘This	is	a	process	I	call	ghosted	inquiry,	in	which	I	subsume	the	other’s	
emotional	remains,	so	to	speak,	through	my	writing.	The	original	body	of	words	
might	have	slipped	out	of	existence,	but	not	the	feelings	they	provoke.	
‘Calling	Chapter	4,	‘Dead	Letters’	is	a	methodological	joke—a	way	of	playing	
with	the	jarred	simile	at	the	heart	of	the	meaning	of	the	chapter	title,	and	with	the	
process	of	constructing	the	past	from	the	vantage	of	the	present.	Ghosting	describes	
the	different	emergences	of	the	past	at	different	points	of	(k)nowing.’	
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‘But	you	use	a	doubly	artificial	means	of	organising	this	succession	of	
ghostings,	don’t	you?	Explain	that.’	Roper	demands.	
‘I	wouldn’t	call	it	artificial.	I	do	term	it	“aesthetic”,	though.	This	reflects	my	
reluctance	to	call	what	I	am	doing	“postmodern”.	I	mean,	nearly	everyone	on	my	
course	leapt	on	postmodernism	as	if	it	offered	a	licence	to	tear	up	the	rulebook.’	She	
grimaces.	‘You	find	out	fairly	quickly	that	ripping	up	the	rules	doesn’t	stop	you	from	
being	judged.	
‘I’m	getting	ahead	of	myself.	On	my	reading	spree	of	a	literature	review	I	
thought	it	was	important	that	I	try	to	fathom	out	what	postmodernism	entails—
partly	set	off	by	a	friend	who	took	a	degree	in	philosophy	rolling	her	eyes	and	
muttering,	‘So	passé!’	every	time	I	brought	up	the	subject.		
‘We’d	been	introduced	to	the	idea	of	making	different	kinds	of	‘judgement	
calls’	(Speedy	2008:	55)	in	order	to	be	able	to	reflect	on	the	merit	of	a	particular	
written	or	visual	representation	of	lived	experience.	So	I	do	recognize	the	necessity	
of	entering	into	some	discussion	of	whether	what	I	have	presented	is	good	enough	
in	terms	of	connecting	us	with	the	feelings	evoked	in	the	events	of	the	letters.	From	
a	literary	perspective,	and	from	my	belief,	as	I	stated	earlier,	that	literature	can	
provide	a	powerful	medium	for	apprehending	experiences	formed	in	social	reality,	I	
buy	into	Speedy’s	criterion	of	‘aesthetic	merit’	(2008:	56).	I	am	also	mindful	of	her	
warning	that,	‘Different	aspects	of	these	criteria	wear	their	cultural	history	
differently’	(2008:	57),	so	this	reinforced	my	need	to	dig	around	in	the	cultural	
history	of	postmodernism.		
‘I	discovered	that	many	of	the	writers	invoked	in	the	cause	of	
postmodernism—Lyotard,	Foucault,	Deleuze—don’t	refer	to	themselves	as	
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postmodernists,	nor	do	they	necessarily	oppose	modernism	with	postmodernism,	
but	argue	their	interrelation	and	progression	(Habermas	1980,	Peters	1999,	
Aylesworth	2013).	Then,	as	I	dug	deeper,	I	discovered	that	judgement	itself:	
must	be	aesthetic	insofar	as	it	does	not	produce	denotative	knowledge	about	a	
determinable	state	of	affairs,	but	refers	to	the	way	our	faculties	interact	with	
each	other	as	we	move	from	one	mode	of	phrasing	to	another	(Aylesworth	
2013:	6,	referring	to	Lyotard	1985	1988)	
‘Obviously,	this	gave	me	pause	for	thought,	since	it	implies	that	in	these	
‘faculties	that	interact	with	each	other’	there	is	something	else	proposed	as	existing	
beyond	utterance—something	that	looks	very	like	some	kind	of	abstract	and	internal	
structure	that	postmodernism	rebels	against.’	
Sonya	finds	a	page	near	the	end	of	her	dissertation.	‘Habermas	points	out	how	
radical	movements	in	modernist	Art	(painting,	literature,	music,	and	so	on)	have	
frequently	rebelled	against	the	aesthetic	norms	of	an	age	or	practice,	and	how	‘to	
retract	all	criteria	and	to	equate	aesthetic	judgement	with	the	expression	of	
subjective	experiences’	constitutes	an	experiment	in	‘nonsense’:	
These	experiments	have	served	to	bring	back	to	life,	and	to	illuminate	all	the	
more	glaringly,	exactly	those	structures	of	art	which	they	were	meant	to	
dissolve.	(1980:	1755).	
‘Habermas	returns	us	to	appreciation	of	the	potential	social	contract	art	forges	
with	experience.	Aesthetic	merit,	for	example,	in	my	appropriation	of	his	argument,	
still	needs	to	do	justice	to	the	human	condition.	
So	lurking	behind—the	ghost	at	the	banquet,	so	to	speak—is	a	very	post-Hitler,	
post-Stalin	concern	for	the	means	and	control	and	expression	of	justice	in	social	life.	
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No	supreme	being,	no	dictator,	no	father-	or	mother-figure,	but	the	ideal	of	justice	
worked	out	through	communication.’		
Sonya	looks	both	her	examiners	in	the	eye.	‘I	like	that,’	she	says.	‘I	aspire	to	
that	re-presentation	of	justice.	We	need	it.	I	need	it.’		
She	turns	back	to	her	dissertation.	‘I	like	these	words	from	Ursula	Le	Guin’s	
acceptance	speech	at	the	National	Book	Awards	(2014):	
Hard	times	are	coming,	when	we’ll	be	wanting	the	voices	of	writers	who	can	
see	alternatives	to	how	we	live	now,	can	see	through	our	fear-stricken	society	
and	its	obsessive	technologies	to	other	ways	of	being,	and	even	imagine	real	
grounds	for	hope.	We’ll	need	writers	who	can	remember	freedom—poets,	
visionaries—realists	of	a	larger	reality.	
‘This	is	what	I	want	from	writing	and	research—that	it	helps	us	realise	a	larger	
reality.’	
It	is	one	of	those	definitive	moments	in	any	viva	when	one	knows	that	the	
candidate	has	won	the	day.		
A	familiar	voice	cuts	through.	‘Still	haven’t	really	answered	my	question.	Why	
did	you	feel	the	need	to	rewrite	the	letters?’	
An	intake	of	breath.	A	smile	as	thin	as	fishing	line.		
‘In	order	to	confuse	the	trail	leading	back	to	the	original	experiences,	I	needed	
to	become	a	kind	of	ghostwriter.	And	the	best	model	for	that	kind	of	rewriting	that	I	
could	think	of	was	through	a	literary	analogy	with	what	poets	do	by	reconstructing	
experience	through	heightened,	sometimes	symbolic	language,	framed	by	a	
particular	form.	Like	in	the	Heaney	poem,	I	wanted	to	look	through	the	forge	door	
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and	illuminate	the	dark.	Like	Heaney,	what	I	am	imagining	is	already	familiar	and	
known,	so	it	is	a	projection	of	experience	as	a	re-presentation.	
‘When	I	first	saw	“dead	letters”	written	on	that	bundle,	what	immediately	
came	into	my	head	was	a	poem.	It’s	by	Gerard	Manley	Hopkins.	One	of	what	are	
known	as	the	‘terrible	sonnets’	(Reeves	in	Hopkins	1954:	xxv).	So	when	I	finally	
opened	the	letters	I	knew	I	had	a	kind	of	simile	of	experience—a	very	close	
equivalent,	which	would	allow	me	to	make	a	ghosting.	
‘I	can	quote	the	first	octet—I	learnt	it	by	heart	in	the	sixth	form:	
I	wake	and	feel	the	fell	of	dark,	not	day.	
What	hours,	O	what	black	hoürs	we	have	spent	
This	night!	what	sights	you,	heart,	saw;	ways	you	went!	
And	more	must,	in	yet	longer	light’s	delay.	
					With	witness	I	speak	this.	But	where	I	say	
Hours	I	mean	years,	mean	life.	And	my	lament	
Is	cries	countless,	cries	like	dead	letters	sent	
To	dearest	him	that	lives	alas!	away.	
‘There	were	four	letters,	and	I	arranged	them—I	mean,	like	a	musical	
arrangement—in	a	series.	I	narrativised	them,	would	be	another	way	of	putting	it.	
There	was	a	set	of	events	being	reported,	which	I	plotted	and	composed	under	
headings	taken	from	the	lexis	of	the	sonnet:	‘dark	fall’;	‘black	hours’;	‘with	witness’;	
‘years	mean	life’.	Then	I	wrote	four	back	at	them:	‘dearest’;	‘deep	decree’;	‘flesh	
filled	blood’;	‘spirit,	see’.		
‘You	have	to	know	the	second	sestet	to	appreciate	the	battle	of	sentiment:	
		I	am	gall,	I	am	heartburn.	God’s	most	deep	decree	
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Bitter	would	have	me	taste:	my	taste	was	me;	
Bones	built	in	me,	flesh	filled,	blood	brimmed	the	curse.	
		Selfyeast	of	spirit	a	dull	dough	sours.	I	see	
The	lost	are	like	this,	and	their	scourge	to	be	
As	I	am	mine,	their	sweating	selves;	but	worse.	
(Hopkins	1885/1954:	69)	
‘That’s	it,	really—that’s	my	way	of	doing	myself	justice	in	terms	of	my	feelings.	
And—this	is	my	hope	for	my	research	argument—that	it	does	justice	to	how	one	
might	go	about	such	inquiry,	theoretically	and	methodologically.’	
‘Well,	I	like	it,’	says	Abby	Farfield.	‘Perhaps	it	is	a	little	premature	to	be	giving	
you	feedback,	but	this	is	original	and	provocative	work.	I	like	your	tendency	to	raise	
notes	of	disquiet.’	
‘Thank-you.’	
‘Well,	let’s	not	count	our	chickens	before	they	are	hatched.	Perhaps	you	could	
just	sum	up	for	us	by	explaining	your	connection	of	ghosting	with	layering—why	is	
this	a	layered	text,	as	you	claim?’	
‘OK—so	contrary	to	popular	belief,	layered	writing	isn’t	about	patching	
together	different	pieces	of	inquiry	or	types	of	text.	If	I	read	Rambo	Ronai	(1999,	
2005)	right	then	layering	is	a	reflexive	and	cyclical	process	of	revealing	experience	by	
stripping	back,	deconstructing,	whilst	building	up—much	as	one	might	do	whilst	
drawing	and	painting:	‘As	I	draw	and	erase,	the	process	becomes	one	of	continuous	
exploration,	adjustment,	and	correction’	(Rambo	2005:	564).	
‘Therefore,	the	paradox,	both	in	existence	and	in	writing,	is	that	for	every	layer	
of	meaning	one	peels	away	another	is	being	laid	down.	Even	as	we	seem	to	be	
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moving	backwards	into	the	depth	of	our	recovery	of	experience,	we	are	actually	
moving	forward	in	our	re-experience	of	it.	This	is	why	I	argue	that	inquiry	writing	is	a	
haunting	process.	
‘Actually,	what	I’d	like	to	do	is	read	you	the	closing	page	of	the	dissertation,	
since	I	believe	it	does	sum	up	what	you	are	requesting,	and	I	could	not	do	the	
argument	justice	in	trying	to	recall	it:	
	‘[Reading]	Ghosts	are	likenesses,	similitudes,	similes	of	our	uncertainty	
regarding	the	unknown	and	what	comes	before	and	after	life.	Ghosts	are	like	
questions	of	whether	and	what	and	why	commingled.	Ghosts	are	fears	and	furies	
and	feelings	that	return,	remains	that	will	not	rest.	
‘If	we	can	only	be	real	through	our	senses	and	our	words,	working	away	at	our	
experiences	with	tools,	like	language,	we	have	made	to	mine	our	modes	of	
apprehension	for	their	lodes	of	meaning,	then	we	live	excavating	layers	as	fast	as	
they	settle.	We	live	drowning	in	now	and	knowing	it,	endlessly	seeing	our	own	selves	
as	spirits	retreating	just	as	we	summon	them	anew.	
‘We	live	in	the	middle,	always	in	the	middle,	blanketed	by	our	recollections	of	
what	is	passing	away	and	our	premonitions	of	what	might	come.	Life	might	start	and	
life	might	end	but	we	live	in	medias	res,	in	the	midst	of	things,	not	in	a	narrative	and	
at	best	just	capable	of	narrating	ourselves.		
‘Lyotard	argues:	‘The	only	thing	absolutely	certain,	and	to	say	this	is	not	to	do	
ontology,	is	that	there	are	phrases’	(1992:	405).	For	sure,	it	is	impossible	to	think	
without	signs,	but	maybe	we	mistake	utterance	for	being,	discourse	for	knowing?	Is	
Habermas	(1980)	perhaps	suggesting	that	we	need	to	strip	back	more	layers	of	our	
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modern	sensibility	and	question	the	deeds	that	lie	beyond	the	horizon	of	our	words?	
Isn’t	what	we	say	a	ghost	of	what	we	do?’	
I	look	up	suddenly—not	towards	the	window	but	through	the	opaque	glass	
wall	that	separates	our	room	from	the	corridor.	A	shadow—not	sure	whether	male	
or	female—moves	along	the	wall	and	seems	to	rest	there.	Nobody	else	notices,	not	
directly	facing	that	way.	We	have	been	examining	now	for	quite	some	time.	It	is	
already	well	into	lunch	break	and	I	wonder	whether	someone	else	has	the	room	
booked	for	the	afternoon.	
Sonya	continues	reading.	‘Like	Badiou,	I	am	still	wedded	to	a	sense	of	being.	
One	of	the	touchstones	of	my	argument	is	this	passage	I	read	some	time	ago	and	
have	been	puzzling	over	ever	since:	
One	could	say,	with	Deleuze:	beyond	the	one	and	the	multiple,	beyond	
identity	and	difference,	beyond	time	and	eternity.	But	‘beyond’	obviously	
does	 not	 signify	 either	 a	 synthesis	 or	 a	 third,	 transcendent,	 term.	
‘Beyond’	means:	 in	 the	middle;	 there	where	 in	 the	 rhizomatic	 network	
virtualisation	and	actualisation	are	exchanged	into	each	other.vii	Being	is	
that	which	 activates	 the	 essential	 falsity	 of	 the	 true	 and	 virtualises	 the	
truth	 of	 the	 false;	 being	 is	 that	 which	 lets	 the	 goodness,	 the	 infernal	
goodness	 of	 evil,	 emerge,	 and	 also	 that	 which	 lets	 the	 terrible	
malevolence	of	the	good	unfold.	(Badiou	2000:	194)	
‘Maybe	I	have	struggled	too	long	with	not	being	good	enough	and	need	
another	way	of	thinking.	Maybe	I	need	a	way	of	judging	myself	that	realises	
imperfection.	Maybe	the	realisation	of	imperfection	is	a	more	valid	project	
personally	and	socially	than	the	perfection	of	truth.	Maybe	in	order	to	be	at	all,	and	
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certainly	to	be	true	to	ourselves,	we	have	to	look	for	good	in	the	bad	in	the	world	
and	anticipate	bad	in	our	good.	Maybe	that	is	the	only	way	to	our	larger	reality,	now	
that	hard	times	are	upon	us.	Maybe	our	only	blessing	lies	in	those	peacemakers	who	
survive	the	depravities	of	our	warmongering.	Maybe	in	the	larger	beyond	our	only	
hope	is	to	realise	reconciliation.’	
It	is	an	impressive	conclusion	and	I	see	that	Don	Roper	is	looking	convinced.	He	
swings	back	in	his	chair	and	announces,	‘That	sounds	like	an	ending	to	me,	Sonya.	
What	do	you	think,	Dr	Farfield?’	
‘Actually	I	do	have	one	final	question.’	
‘OK.’	
‘I	do	have	a	worry	regarding	the	ethics	of	your	research.’	
	‘Oh?’	Sonya	looks	anxious.	
‘I	presume	you	were	required	to	seek	approval	of	your	research	intention	
through	your	university’s	ethics’	procedure?’	
‘Yes—I	did.	There	is	a	long	section	on	ethics	in	the	final	chapter	in	which	I	
reflect	on	the	issues	raised	by	the	research.’	
‘Yes.	I	read	that.	However,	I	note	that	the	education	department	expects	you	
to	have	had	an	ethics’	conversation	with	your	supervisor	and	that	the	summary	of	
that	conversation	is	submitted	as	an	appendix	to	the	dissertation.	I	don’t	see	it.’	
‘No.	Sorry—it	is	an	oversight—I	was	in	quite	a	rush	to	meet	my	final	deadline	
for	submission.’	
‘Did	your	supervisor	have	an	opportunity	to	check	your	dissertation	before	it	
was	submitted?’	
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‘No—as	I	say,	I	was	right	up	against	it.	To	be	honest,	I	didn’t	even	show	her	the	
final	draft.’	
‘My	concern	is	for	this	family	member,	whose	letters	you	use.	Did	you	seek	
permission	to	use	the	letters?	Have	you	sought	informed	consent?	Surely	you	and	
your	supervisor	must	have	thought	of	this?’	
‘Well,	it	is	difficult.	The	family	situation	is	difficult.	And	the	person	in	question	
is	no	longer	around.’	
‘Life	history	research	tends	to	be	difficult—especially	if	it	involves	family.	Did	
you	not	think	about	Sikes’	(2010)	warning	about	the	possibility	of	people	being	upset	
by	reading	researchers’	portrayals?’	
‘Well,	I	have	thought	about	that,	but	I	don’t	think	there	is	much	chance	of	this	
person	reading	my	writing,	to	be	honest.’	
‘Well,	not	thinking	that	there	is	‘much	chance’	is	your	judgement	call	of	at	least	
some	probability,	rather	than	a	categorical	‘no	chance’,	surely?	You	seem	to	be	
tacitly	acknowledging	that	these	experiences,	that	we	are	led	to	believe	are	those	of	
somebody	in	your	family—even	though	you	have	taken	great	pains	to	disguise	the	
trail,	as	you	said	earlier—might	still	reflect	someone’s	private	life	without	their	
approval	or	consent.	
‘Let	me	just	remind	you	what	Sikes	writes:	
[H]ow	we	describe	people's	lives	is	how	they	appear	to,	and	in,	the	world	
through	our	writing,	however	much	any	depiction	is	the	result	of	our	own	
auto/biographical	interpretation,	the	product	of	our	vocabulary	and	our	skill	
with	words,	the	outcome	of	our	concern	to	use	the	life/lives	to	support	a	
particular	argument	and/or	our	theorising,	and	so	on.	(Sikes	2010:	15)	
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‘Somewhere	out	here	in	the	world	is	the	potential	for	someone	to	be	hurt	
because	you	are	claiming	their	experiences	for	your	argument.	This	isn’t	a	ghost	we	
are	talking	about.	This	isn’t	a	figure	or	conceit	in	a	clever	poetics	of	methodology.	
This	is	a	real	person	in	this	larger	reality	you	mention,	and	they	deserve	justice.	
‘My	worry	is	that—for	all	your	cleverness	and	sophistication	with	ideas,	which	I	
cannot	fault—you	have	overlooked	the	blindingly	obvious.	
‘Have	you	really	considered	how	this	other	person	might	feel	to	have	these	
experiences	intimated	to	the	wider	world?’	
We	all	look	at	Sonya,	who	is	trembling.	The	room	seems	suddenly	very	cold.	
Sonya	looks	at	me,	‘Could	you	turn	off	the	Dictaphone,	please?	
‘I	knew	I	wasn’t	going	to	get	away	with	it,’	she	says	ruefully.	
The	shadow	outside	the	room	lifts	off	the	opaque	glass	wall.	Momentarily,	a	
woman’s	face	appears	at	the	door	and	glances	in.	Whatever	she	sees	seems	to	
satisfy	her,	and	she	leaves.	It	is	nobody	I	recognize.	I	hear	her	footsteps	retreating	as	
she	goes.	
‘It	was	a	long	time	ago—over	thirty	years.	I	have	changed	my	name.	I	have	
changed	the	details.	I	have	no	family	that	owns	me	now.	Nobody	can	make	
connections	because	I	no	longer	am	as	I	was.	
‘I’ll	tell	you	only	what	I	have	told	my	supervisor.	You	cannot	pass	this	
information	on,	so	it	stays	in	this	room	between	us.	I	will	not	tell	you	my	original	
name.	You	will	have	to	accept	that	what	I	am	about	to	tell	you	is	truthful,	if	not	the	
whole	truth.	
‘I	was	training	to	be	an	English	teacher.	Not	here.	I	fell	in	love	with	another	
teacher	during	my	Spring	term	placement.	She	was	married.	I	got	my	first	teaching	
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job	at	her	school.	It	all	went	wrong.	I	lost	it	in	the	car	park	one	evening.	Her	husband	
took	her	death	badly	and	tried	to	kill	himself.’	
In	the	window,	Sonya’s	reflection	seems	to	stare	back	at	her	and	moan.	
‘I	paid	over	many	years.	In	prison	the	only	friends	I	had	lived	in	books	and	
songs.	
‘There	was	one	that	seemed	to	sing	endlessly	in	my	head:	
Just	when	I	think	I'm	winning	
When	I've	broken	every	door	
The	ghosts	of	my	life	
Blow	wilder	than	before	
(Sylvian	1981)	
‘So	when	I	got	parole,	when	I	started	sorting	out	my	life	outside,	I	couldn’t	go	
back	to	teaching,	but	I	could	keep	on	studying—Open	University,	extramural	
courses,	that	sort	of	thing.	Working	full	time	and	taking	it	bit	by	bit.	And	eventually,	I	
found	a	place	in	myself	where	I	wanted	to	reach	back	into	my	dark.	And	this	
narrative	research	seemed	to	offer	me	the	chance	to	make	a	door.	
‘But	concealment	is	everything—erasing	the	footprints	and	covering	over	the	
traces,	so	the	track	leads	back	but	never	arrives,	so	people	and	things	don't	pair	any	
more—this	is	the	only	kind	of	inquiry	I	can	honestly	commit	to.’	
Sonya	laughs,	‘Right	from	the	start	I	knew	I	would	end	up	doctoring	my	
doctorate.	
‘So	it	comes	down	to	providing	a	piece	of	paper	from	someone	that	shows	
informed	consent	in	order	to	pass	this	viva,	does	it?’	
She	traces	the	title	page	of	her	dissertation	with	her	fingertips.	
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‘Sonya—this	is	who	I	am	now—Sonya.	Sonya	Morris	is	the	author	of	this	work.	
What’s	to	stop	me	giving	this	other	‘me’	permission?	I	don’t	have	to	give	my	real	
name,	and	nobody	will	know	who	‘I’	was—I	just	have	to	consent	to	being	the	other	
member	in	a	family,	which	no-one	except	us	will	know	really	numbers	one.	
‘Where’s	the	lie	in	that?’	
	
CODA	
	
Coda	is	the	Italian	word	for	tail;	as	a	formal	device	in	music	and	literature	it	supplies	
a	conclusion,	an	end.	For	Labov	(1997),	the	coda	of	an	oral	story	returns	the	
utterance	to	its	present	as	a	way	of	finalizing	the	narrative	act.	My	tale	already	has	
an	ending,	so	this	other	tail	I	am	writing	must	be	returning	us	to	someplace	other	
than	the	time	and	world	of	Sonya’s	story.	Some	other	genre,	with	an	uneasy	
connection	to	the	institution	of	writing	in	the	social	sciences	(Bazerman	1981,	
Watson	2011),	is	becoming	written	into	being.	
	
In	general,	I	am	loath	to	reflect	beyond	a	tale	itself,	because	I	believe	it	should	have	
sufficient	backbone	to	support	its	own	weight	of	interpretation,	and	will	do,	if	it	is	
well	enough	crafted.	However,	I	realise	that	a	handbook	designed	for	narrative	
inquirers	does	expect	some	rationale	concerning	the	craft	of	research,	so	although	I	
won’t	be	telling	you	(and	me)	what	‘The	Door	and	the	Dark’	means,	I	would	like	to	
discuss	my	intention.	My	single	caveat	is	that	intentionality	(Crotty	1998,	Jacob	
2014)	reaches	out	to	ideas	and	possibilities	that	are	discovered	in	the	tracks	and	
their	obliteration	by	which	writing	proceeds.	Whilst	writing	‘The	Door	and	the	Dark’,	
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and	later	writing	this	coda,	I	did	not	work	forearmed	with	what	I	wished	to	state—it	
emerged	in	the	work	itself.	
	
I	wanted	(here	is	intentionality	plain	as	day)	to	write	a	tale	that	could	serve	an	
academic	argument	whilst	remaining	a	piece	of	fiction.	As	a	university	teacher	of	
research	methods	that	explore	that	panoply	of	approaches	we	might	call	‘narrative	
inquiry’,	I	have	tried	here	to	journey	in	my	professional	world.	However,	my	process	
of	inquiry	is	not	simply	directed	by	experience—I	do	not	think	my	method	is	to	drive	
forward	in	an	act	of	extension	from	historical	actuality,	starting	with	facts	and	
reworking	them	artistically	to	create	a	nonfiction	(Sparkes	2002:	155).	‘The	Door	and	
the	Dark’	is	not	a	fictionalisation	of	a	real	event	any	more	than	it	is	a	realisation	of	a	
fictional	idea—it	is	a	mess	of	both	and	more	besides.	It	summons	a	textual	world,	
which	could	only	happen	in	writing—a	semic	world	(Peirce	1906)	of	layers	that	peel,	
wear	away,	stratify	and	buckle,	to	reveal	no	more	reality	or	permanence	than	
written	culture	and	its	institutions	afford.	The	‘writer’s	problem’,	according	to	Van	
Manen,	is	that	‘every	word	kills	and	becomes	the	death	of	the	object	it	tries	to	
represent’	(2002:	244).	This	is	the	irreality	that	fiction	makes.	
	
There	is	lived	experience	at	play	in	the	tale,	particularly	Sonya’s	history	as	a	student	
of	English	literature	and	teacher	of	English,	which	is	my	background—both	of	us	are	
unruly	lay	members	of	the	sociological	and	psychological	churches	that	tend	to	
organise	worship	in	the	form	of	educational	research.	The	Bristol	location	is	my	take	
on	where	I	live	and	work	and	the	university	building	is	portrayed	fairly	accurately	as	
it	is	now	and	as	it	was	over	twenty	years	ago.	I	name	check	the	programme	I	teach.	I	
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do	examine	doctoral	theses	and	dissertations	and	I	do	sit	in	the	vivas	of	my	
supervisees	when	they	are	examined.	On	the	other	hand,	I	have	never	come	across	a	
dissertation	even	remotely	similar	to	Sonya’s.	I	have	never	experienced	as	supervisor	
or	examiner	the	problem	my	tale	unravels.	All	the	names	and	events	are	made	up	
and	are	not	actual	people	cunningly	disguised.		
	
All	that	you	have	read	drifts	in	that	somewhere	between	what	is	and	what	if	(Reed	
2011)	that	is	no	place	at	all.	Only	in	a	world	fabricated	through	imagination	have	I	
been	there	in	that	room	with	Sonya.	Yet	I	have	been	in	and	around	that	imagined	
room	for	days	and	days.	
	
Arthur	Frank	explains	that:	‘Research	is,	in	the	simplest	terms,	one	person’s	
representation	of	another’	(2005:	966).	Frank	explores,	through	the	work	of	the	
Russian	critical	theorist,	Mikhail	Bakhtin,	the	concept	of	dialogicality—how	all	
utterance	necessitates	discourse	with	an	other,	even	when	talking	to	and	of	one’s	
self.	Frank	is	arguing	the	ethics	of	research	writing,	that	‘in	a	dialogical	relation,	any	
person	takes	responsibility	for	the	other’s	becoming,	as	well	as	recognizing	that	the	
other’s	voice	has	entered	one’s	own’	(2005:	967).	Writing	has	a	powerful	act	of	
responsibility	for	becoming	others,	and	what	and	whom	one	becomes,	yet	these	acts	
of	representation	and	re-presentation	are	necessarily	unfinalized,	never	fully	
finished,	never	complete	in	meaning	or	truth	or	reality:		
[T]he	researcher	never	understands	a	person	as	fixed	in	any	representation	of	
his	or	her	words.	Instead,	the	meaning	of	any	present	story	depends	on	the	
stories	it	will	generate.	One	story	calls	forth	another,	both	from	the	storyteller	
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him	or	herself,	and	from	the	listener/recipient	of	the	story.	(Frank	2005:	967)	
	
For	me	too,	Bakhtin	has	been	one	of	those	thinkers	with	whom	over	the	years	I	
‘engage	in	a	running	conversation’	(Crotty	1998:	216).	Dialogicality	is	artfully,	
actively,	in	its	ethical	sense	even	wickedly	at	play	in	‘The	Door	and	the	Dark’.	
However,	the	question	I	think	that	I	am	asking,	both	of	myself	and	through	what	the	
tale	inquires,	is	from	where	this	calling	forth	of	others	that	are	and	are	not	ourselves	
happens?	If	one’s	first	bat	in	the	game	of	inquiry	through	writing	is	not	at	experience	
and	one	is	not	creating	a	nonfiction,	then	the	alternative	field	on	which	to	start	is	
aesthetic	rather	than	experiential.	Of	course,	this	other	starting-point	is	frequently	
explained	as	a	field	of	aesthetic	experience	through	reference	to	what	one	has	read,	
and	of	course	these	rich	fictive	worlds	of	imagination	and	their	texts	come	out	to	
play	in	Sonya’s	dissertation.	Which	of	course	is	just	a	pretend	dissertation	after	all,	
isn’t	it?	But	aren’t	there	places	beyond	factual	and	literary	experience	from	which	to	
write—places,	that	is,	within	the	process	of	writing	itself?	Which	is	to	speak	of	
writing	as	a	place	and	process	of	self—perhaps	a	procession	of	selvings?	And	
solvings.	And	dissolvings.	
	
Steeped	in	Russian	language	and	literature,	one	of	the	first	scholars	to	introduce	
Bakhtin’s	work	and	ideas	to	the	West	was	Tzvetan	Todorov.	Foremost	among	them	is	
one	to	do	with	creative	activity,	which	Bakhtin	would	call	aesthetic	activity:	
Bakhtin	asserts	the	necessity	of	distinguishing	between	two	stages	in	every	
creative	act:	first	the	stage	of	empathy	or	identification	(the	novelist	puts	
himself	in	the	place	of	his	character),	then	the	reverse	movement	whereby	the	
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novelist	returns	to	his	own	position.	This	second	aspect	of	creative	activity	is	
named	by	Bakhtin	with	a	new	Russian	coinage:	vnenakhodimost,	literally	
“finding	oneself	outside,”	which	I	shall	translate,	again	literally,	but	with	a	
Greek	root,	as	exotopy.	(Todorov,	1984:	99)	
	
Finding	oneself	outside	and	returning	to	oneself.	Finding	oneself	outside	and	not	
being	able	to	return	to	oneself.	Is	this	Sonya’s	dilemma?	And	by	extension	is	this	the	
danger	of	all	writers	and	inquirers	who	set	off	to	explore	worlds	of	self	and	realms	of	
experience?	
	
And	when	it	succeeds,	this	seeing	ourselves,	is	it	reality	we	reach?	According	to	
Bakhtinviii:	
When	it	[seeing	oneself	from	the	outside]	succeeds,	what	is	striking,	in	our	
external	image,	is	a	sort	of	strange	void,	its	ghostlike	character,	and	its	
somewhat	sinister	loneliness.	(Bakhtin	quoted	in	Todorov	1984:	95)	
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																																																									i	A	viva	voce	is	an	examination	‘by	live	voice’	in	defence	of	one’s	dissertation	or	thesis,	usually	for	the	
award	of	a	doctorate.	In	the	British	university	system	this	normally	entails	a	closed	meeting	in	which	
the	candidate	is	questioned	on	his	or	her	written	dissertation	(submitted	to	examiners	in	advance)	by	
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qualification,	and	one	appointed	from	inside).	The	candidate’s	academic	supervisor	is	normally	invited	
to	the	viva	in	a	non-speaking	capacity.	In	some	universities	an	independent	chair	is	invited	to	oversee	
the	process.	When	the	examiners	are	satisfied	that	sufficient	questions	have	been	asked	to	explore	
the	candidate’s	claim	to	having	achieved	a	doctoral	level	of	research,	the	candidate	and	supervisor	
withdraw	and	the	examiners	decide	their	recommendation,	which	is	told	subsequently	to	the	
candidate	face	to	face.	It	is	usual	that	examiners	recommend	a	pass	and	also	require	the	candidate	to	
make	corrections	and	changes	to	the	written	dissertation	within	a	strict	time	period,	after	which	the	
degree	may	be	awarded	by	the	university’s	examinations’	committee.	Different	countries	have	
differing	traditions	and	practices	regarding	the	viva—in	many	European	contexts	the	oral	defence	is	a	
public	event.	
ii	‘figure,	n.’.	OED	Online.	September	2014.	Oxford	University	Press.	
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/70079?rskey=ICVp0jandresult=1andisAdvanced=false	
iii	In	this	article,	any	use	of	italic	in	a	quotation	is	given	in	the	original.	
iv	King	James	Bible	(1611)	Genesis,	1.2		
http://www.kingjamesbibleonline.org/1611_Genesis-Chapter-1/	
v	First	published	in	French	in	1966.	
vi	‘ghost,	n.’.	OED	Online.	September	2014.	Oxford	University	Press.	
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/78064?isAdvanced=falseandresult=1andrskey=w3m0tqand	
vii	Badiou,	A.	(2000)	‘Of	life	as	a	name	of	being,	or,	Deleuze’s	vitalist	ontology’,	Pli,	10:	191-199	is	a	
translation	from	the	French.	The	English	text	actually	reads	‘virtualisation	and	actualization	are	
exchanged	into	each	other	being	is	that	which	activates…’	This	is	an	oversight	in	the	editing	of	the	
paper	and	I	have	proposed	a	more	logical	punctuation	based	on	a	different	translation	to	be	found	in	
Badiou,	A.	(2006)	Briefings	on	Existence:	a	short	treatise	on	transitory	ontology;	trans.	ed.	and	intro.	
N.	Madarasz,	Albany:	State	University	of	New	York:	65.	
viii	Bakhtin’s	works	are	not	listed	in	my	references	since	in	this	instance	I	am	referring	to	Todorov	
(1984)	who	is	quoting	from	a	Russian	publication	that	is	not	available	in	English.	
